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Abstract 
This paper provides an account of the challenges and potentialities of a solidarity-based 
approach to data access and governance. To do that, it offers an infraethical understanding of 
solidarity that describes it as a structural moral enabler that can sustain collective action and 
risk taking. The paper ends with a brief discussion of health data access as a possible case study 
to test this approach. 
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Introduction 
The emergence of big-data technologies and the consequent increasingly networked character 
of society caused a paradigm shift in contemporary ethics. Traditional ethical theories, which 
assume the relevance of individual responsibility and individual decision making, needed to be 
conceptually reframed insofar as new moral actors—for example, artificial multiagent 
systems—entered the moral domain and transformed it deeply. From this reconceptualisation, 
new, big-data-based ethical models emerged, which soon took a central position in 
philosophical debates. These include models of distributed morality (Floridi 2013a; Heersmink 
2017), which allow ethicists to address the fact that, because of complex interactions among 
multiagent systems, moral actions and responsibilities are no longer centred on individuals, but 
are also distributed across society. 
In this paper, I will first provide a brief analysis of these new models, highlighting both 
their main characteristics and their potential societal effects (sec. 1). In doing this, I will focus 
on the notion of infraethics (or infrastructure ethics), which refers to the “first-order framework 
of implicit expectations, attitudes, and practices that can facilitate and promote morally good 
decisions and actions” (Floridi 2013a, 738; see also Floridi 2017). Among these practices are 
trust, respect, transparency, and reliability. I will then argue in favour of including solidarity 
among such infraethical practices (sec. 2). To do that, I will provide a brief account of 
solidarity, which I contend is particularly relevant because it is conducive to sustained 
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collective action and risk taking. More precisely, solidarity can be understood as a moral and 
political desideratum insofar as it stimulates and supports longer-term and risk-laden collective 
action aimed at addressing perceived injustices (Meacham and Tava forthcoming; Prainsack 
and Buyx 2017; Scholz 2008)—all characteristics that clarify how solidarity is not merely a 
descriptive notion that indicates a certain form of human togetherness, but a fundamental, 
infrastructural dimension of democratic life. 
In section 3, I will then contend that an infraethical model of solidarity might offer a 
powerful tool for tackling one of the most challenging issues that underpins our digital way of 
life—namely, how we own and use digital data. Looking at one of the most advanced models 
of data access and governance (the evidence-based, default-open, risk-managed, user-centred 
[EDRU] model—see Ritchie 2014 and Ritchie and Green 2016), one can easily detect the 
growing importance that collective and societal aspects have in this domain. Whilst traditional 
models are defensive in nature as they are essentially anchored in the costs and risks to the data 
owner, this more advanced model relies on the principle that society is the relevant locus of 
costs and benefits. I will argue that adding an infraethical narrative to this approach, which 
would pinpoint solidarity-based practices’ impact on data sharing, would permit data-access 
researchers and stakeholders to better understand the inner mechanisms of the community of 
interest that data owners and users constitute. Introducing the concept of solidarity into data-
access practices would therefore highlight the growing relevance of collective interests and 
aims to the determination of how personal information is owned and used. 
I will conclude by showing why developing an infraethical, solidarity-based approach to 
data access is particularly urgent now that humanity is facing the Covid-19 pandemic (sec. 4). 
Today more than ever, access or lack of access to data (specifically, health data) might have 
major consequences for public security and public health. I will show how an approach based 
on solidarity can help implement models of data access and sharing that place societal needs at 
their centre. 
 
1. Distributed Morality and Infraethics 
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Distributed morality (Floridi and Sanders 2004; Floridi 2013a; Floridi 2013b, chap. 13) is a 
phenomenon with ever-increasing impact on society due to the emergence and dissemination 
of new information and communication technologies that range from digitisation techniques to 
algorithmic decision making. The idea that morality is not exclusively centred on the individual 
and on her capacity to act autonomously and responsibly is not new. For instance, phenomena 
such as collective moral responsibility and obligation, which highlight the significance of non-
individual decision making and accountability, have often been analysed by ethicists, jurists, 
and political scientists (Isaacs 2011; Isaacs and Vernon 2011; Hess et al. 2018). However, this 
research is gaining momentum in light of the central role that artificial agents and hybrid 
multiagent systems are playing in the infosphere in which we live. Our everyday life (on both 
the personal and societal levels) is increasingly influenced by operations undertaken by 
artificial agents—that is, by “sufficiently informed, ‘smart’, autonomous artefacts, able to 
perform morally relevant actions, independently of the humans who engineered them, causing 
‘artificial good’ and ‘artificial evil’” (Floridi 2013a, 728). Interlinked technical innovations 
such as, for instance, big-data technologies, deep learning, the semantic web, and the Internet 
of Things have given rise to a variety of new agents that are progressively less dependent on 
their creators and therefore play an independent role in the public sphere. This phenomenon 
has a major impact on certain pivotal moral concepts, such as responsibility and power, whose 
relational (rather than individual) facet is progressively coming to light (Zwitter 2014). 
This scenario is made even more complex by the formation of multiagent systems, which 
can be human, artificial, or hybrid. The fundamental assumption of distributed morality is that 
a series of small actions, which a number of agents (human, artificial, or mixed) perform and 
which taken individually are morally neutral or morally negligible, can generate morally 
charged (either good or evil) big actions as soon as they are embedded in a powerful multiagent 
system. Floridi (2013a) gives several examples of this phenomenon, focusing on the good side 
of the coin. Take, for instance, a company that reinvests part of the profits deriving from its 
customers’ purchases to sustain humanitarian projects. Such an operation involves a series of 
actions (performed by the company itself, its customers, and all the artificial agents that 
constitute the company’s technological platform) that taken individually can be described as 
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morally neutral. Only the big action of this multiagent system, and not the actions of its 
components, seems to be morally loaded. 
Assuming that the majority of individual actions that human or artificial agents perform 
are morally neutral or morally negligible, the central challenge in a distributed-morality 
framework is how to ensure that the sum of these individual actions will generate a good rather 
than an evil outcome. This can be ensured by strengthening the resilience and fault tolerance 
of our ethical environment whilst weakening its inherent inertia (Floridi 2013a, 736). In other 
words, we have to learn how to identify potentially good actions and facilitate their aggregation 
into virtuous multiagent systems, while at the same time we have to isolate and neutralise 
possibly evil actions. To do that, we need to establish what Floridi (2013a) calls “infraethics”—
that is, a “first-order framework of implicit expectations, attitudes, and practices that can 
facilitate and promote morally good decisions and actions” (738). These expectations, attitudes, 
and practices operate as moral enablers insofar as they help aggregate potentially good actions 
and disperse potentially negative actions, although they do not need to be morally characterised 
either positively or negatively. Examples of such enablers are information transparency (Turilli 
and Floridi 2009) and privacy (Floridi 2005, 2006), trust online (Taddeo 2009, 2010), and 
openness (Chopra and Dexter 2008). In what follows, I will contend that solidarity (as I define 
it) should be understood as an infraethical phenomenon that can facilitate the emergence of 
positive moral behaviours in an environment characterised by distributed morality. 
 
2. Why Solidarity? 
The concept of solidarity has a relatively short history compared with other pivotal moral and 
political concepts such as democracy and freedom (Metz 1999; Stjernø 2004). Various 
accounts of solidarity have identified several traits that are deemed as essential to 
understanding its meaning and function. Solidarity relations are often described as historically 
grounded on a principle of equal and freely given support among peers (Metz 1999). People 
who establish a bond of solidarity must recognise their similarity in a relevant respect 
(Prainsack and Buyx 2017), whether it be similarity of features (for example, belonging to a 
certain social group or sharing the same language, nationality, or religion) or to similarity of 
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motivation and agency (for example, sharing the same goals). Other commonly identified traits 
include mutual responsibility (Bayertz 1999), the recognition of individual freedom (Honneth 
1995) and the aim of democratically establishing it (Brunkhorst 2005), and the entailment of 
positive duties such as cooperation and reciprocity (Scholz 2008, 58). 
I think that at least two features stem from these characterisations, which I contend are 
essential to defining solidarity relations. First, in order for people or institutions to set solidarity 
in motion, they must share certain goals and ideals of justice. In this sense, although 
acknowledging their shared status (for example, qua compatriots or fellow workers) might help 
create or strengthen solidarity bonds, the emergence of solidarity also requires collectively 
aiming to overcome perceived inequalities or injustices that a certain social condition might 
involve.1 Take, for instance, Thelma and Louise. They might enjoy knowing that they are both 
American citizens, and the knowledge of this similarity may be the origin of a number of 
sentiments such as sympathy, trust, or even camaraderie. Nonetheless, this would not be a 
sufficient condition for the emergence of a solidarity relation. To be in solidarity, Thelma and 
Louise must also act in unison in response to (for instance) a threat or act of violence and to 
re-establish what they believe is just. 
Second, the sharing of goals depends on the willingness of individuals and groups to also 
assume the costs and burdens that these goals might involve with at least the expectation that 
their action will be reciprocated. This element helps differentiate solidarity from other 
intersubjective relationships such as benevolence and charity. For instance, when a group of 
workers decide to establish a mutual relationship of solidarity, they know that this decision has 
consequences that might be detrimental (for example, job loss, discomfort due to a prolonged 
strike) and nonetheless decide to act anyway and to equally share the burden of these potential 
consequences. 
We can also argue that the first element justifies the second in that sharing goals or ideals 
incites willingness to also share costs and risks with an eye towards longer-term gain and an 
increased probability of achieving the shared goals. The willingness to shoulder burdens and 
                                                        
1 By justice and injustice, I do not mean here any specific theory of justice or juridical system but both 
the perception of such phenomena that individuals and groups may have as part of their lifeworld 
experience and the meanings and values that they form from this perception. 
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take risks with the aim of pursuing potentially longer-term political and socioeconomic goals 
is furthermore supported, in a virtuous circle, by the sharing of the risk, which can mitigate 
individual risk. Hence solidarity facilitates collective decision making, collective action, and 
longer-term political action and planning—all characteristics that can be described as 
desiderata of a democratic society. Solidarity is thus not just a descriptive notion that indicates 
a certain form of human togetherness, but a fundamental, infrastructural dimension of 
democratic life. 
This infrastructural dimension is what suggests that solidarity might be employed within 
an infraethical framework as a powerful moral enabler. Like other enablers (for example, trust 
or privacy), solidarity as such is morally neutral insofar as it is not inherently good or evil (even 
a group of criminals can share goals, a perception of justice, and risks and burdens). Despite 
this neutrality, however, solidarity has the power to foster collective action and collective risk 
taking and may or may not (depending on the use that we make of it) therefore be conducive 
to morally good outcomes and consequently to a general reinforcement and amelioration of the 
infraethical environment in which it operates. In the next section I will portray a concrete 
scenario in which solidarity can be employed in this way. 
 
3. Solidarity and Data Access 
How we collect, own, and employ data is one of the oldest questions that humankind has had 
to address. The capacity to retain information from our own experience and to make good use 
of this information over time without having to relearn notions and practices that (as a species) 
we have already learned is a fundamental human skill whose evolution and perfection enabled 
the progress of humanity. In the present age, new problems have arisen concerning how to 
analyse and organise the increasing amount of information that new technological devices 
allow us to obtain. The ontological and ethical consequences of big data are tightly connected 
to the topic of distributed morality insofar as they require us to move away from traditional 
moral concepts, such as individual responsibility and decision making, causality, and 
culpability, and to envision forms of relational, systemic morality. The development of network 
and information ethics (Bynum 2011) has allowed researchers to address this modified scenario 
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and to tackle new ethical dilemmas stemming from it. The ethics of big data shows how moral 
responsibility is no longer entirely ascribable to individual agents, but is rather spread 
throughout a network of data generators, collectors, and users. Consequently, whilst concepts 
that were once pivotal, such as individual agency, lose their centrality, other phenomena, such 
as network knock-on effects—that is, the unintended consequences of and collateral damage 
caused by actions within a network—become of primary importance (Zwitter 2014). 
One of the sectors that the current setup has most profoundly altered is data access and 
data security (Micheli et al. 2018). How do we grant access to data in a responsible and 
productive way—that is, without compromising (for instance) the property, security, and 
privacy of data owners and users? What are the ethical guidelines that citizens and institutions 
should follow to make good use of their data? An example of how new digital, data-driven 
technologies are altering established notions in this area is group privacy. It is well known how 
public and private companies make strategic use of data analysis in order to mine data about 
habits and customs of citizens and customers. These datasets constitute raw material that, once 
thoroughly refined, can generate valuable outcomes such as higher revenues or more efficient 
policies. The collection and analysis of personal data involves the risk of privacy breach, which 
is traditionally prevented through de-individualisation. In other words, according to traditional 
privacy protocols, personal data can be collected as long as they are disjointed from the specific 
person who generated them. Although de-individualisation makes personal anonymisation 
possible, it cannot guarantee group anonymisation (Dwork 2006; Zwitter 2014). This means 
that de-individualised data still provide information regarding the opinions, habits, and tastes 
of social groups and population strata, and those data can be employed in a targeted way for 
specific purposes (from marketing to political campaigning). Big-data technologies have the 
power to facilitate this process and to provide more and more fine-grained pictures of group 
characteristics thanks to their ability to enhance hyperconnectivity and identify hidden 
correlations among data. This aspect raises huge ethical issues and must be considered in the 
development of innovative and data-informed privacy policies. 
These and other aspects have substantially informed the design of new models of data 
access and governance. Traditional models of data access are defensive in nature and anchored 
in the costs and risks to the data owner. This perspective implies that the primary aim of any 
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data-access strategy is to prevent malicious misuse, which results in the extensive use of worst-
case scenarios and protection against hypothetical possibilities (Green and Ritchie 2016, vi). 
A default-closed strategy underpins these models. Their developers start from the fundamental 
question “Are we allowed to do this?”, which is defensive insofar as it interprets regulations as 
a shield. The aforementioned technological advancements in the field of digital, data-driven 
technologies, and the subsequent emergence of hypernetworked societies widely characterised 
by distributed moral frameworks, helps reveal the inadequacy of default-closed traditional 
models. Recent analytic reports such as the Data Access Project2 exemplify an alternative 
approach: “An alternative is to consider the law as one of the tools to be used in designing data 
strategies; the appropriate question is ‘how do I lawfully achieve what I want?’. This alternative 
approach, of deciding objectives and studying the legal framework to see how an objective can 
be achieved, is a key part of the EDRU ethos” (Green and Ritchie 2016, 33). According to its 
developers, an EDRU approach has the power to substantially modify and improve the way in 
which data are owned and used (Ritchie 2014; Ritchie 2016; Green and Ritchie 2016). 
The aim of this paper is not to provide an exhaustive analysis of the EDRU approach or 
of any other innovative model of data access. Of all the traits that are central in the EDRU 
approach, the one that is most relevant here is its focus on the collective and societal aspects 
and constraints of data access. According to this model, the relevant locus of costs and benefits 
of data access is no longer the data owner but society, which corresponds to a community of 
interest between data owners and users. Therefore, the decision making is not grounded on 
individual agency and responsibility, but (in line with the fundamental assumptions of 
distributed morality) rather corresponds to a balance of subjective probabilities. On the basis 
of these premises, this model establishes that data should be made available for research 
purposes if “the expected benefit to society outweighs the potential loss of privacy for the 
individual” (Green and Ritchie 2016). The most challenging question is how to calculate this 
benefit. I contend that a solidarity-based approach would offer a decisive contribution to 
overcoming this challenge. In section 2, I characterised solidarity as a principle that has the 
                                                        
2 This report was prepared for the Australian Department of Social Services by Elizabeth Green and 
Felix Ritchie of Bristol Economic Analysis at the University of the West of England, Bristol. 
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power to foster collective action and risk taking and that can therefore be conducive to morally 
good outcomes. This makes solidarity a moral enabler in an infraethical environment. For the 
same reason, solidarity can also be seen as a valuable tool to identify what societal benefits 
justify individual risk taking. In other words, analysing the solidarity relations among the 
members of a society might help determine their willingness to shoulder burdens and take risks 
(for example, to partially renounce their privacy by granting broader data access) in order to 
benefit their community of interest. In the next section, I will briefly point to a potential case 
study that might highlight this mechanism. 
 
4. Data Access and the Public Good 
In the middle of a global pandemic, the major impact of data access on public health has 
become one of the most discussed topics not just among experts but more generally in the 
public discourse. This discussion essentially concerns the potentialities and boundaries that 
accessing and sharing health data in order to track the confirmed cases of Covid-19 infections 
and prevent further epidemic outbreaks would imply. This ongoing crisis is a perfect example 
of how solidarity practices might successfully be implemented in the governance of data 
access. Appeals to solidarity have emerged in various scientific reports on the pandemic. The 
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (2020) issued a statement on 2 
April 2020 in which they claimed that “this pandemic should be seized, not as an opportunity 
but as a call, to foster solidarity at the European and global level. This must manifest itself in 
concrete actions such as the honest sharing and pooling of information, experiences, 
innovations and resources”. Barbara Prainsack (one of the authors of the aforementioned 
statement), discussing the difficulties of raising solidarity in times of pandemic, has recently 
claimed that “rather than only celebrating solidarity where we see it happen, we need to build 
institutions and circumstances that can make solidarity stable and lasting” (Prainsack 2020; see 
on this also Wagenaar & Prainsack 2020). These institutions include public infrastructures, 
solidaristic healthcare, and fair taxation systems. Implementing a solidarity-based healthcare 
system depends on the willingness of data owners to share data in order to help trace the 
contagion and allow public health institutions to take countermeasures that might lead to clear 
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public goods and societal benefits. Several analyses of the importance of a solidarity-based 
approach to biomedicine and public health precede the pandemic and highlight new areas of 
application for this concept (for example Prainsack and Buyx 2011, 2017). What is still lacking 
is a more general account of the potentialities of this solidarity-based approach—whereby 
solidarity is understood as an infrastructural moral enabler in today’s society—in the broader 
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